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Abstract. In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract high ability workers 
(hipo’s) in situations of unemployment. I show that the higher unemployment, the 
larger a firm’s incentives to sort high and low ability workers. Moreover, workers 
will signal their (high) ability in situations of (high) unemployment only if a job 
offers a high enough wage. The main result, therefore, says that a firm sets higher 
wages, the higher unemployment. As the model is applicable to the upper segment 
of the labour market, the result is in line with the empirical fact that income 
inequality increases when more people are unemployed.  
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1.Introduction 
 
Since the pioneering work of Spence (1973) many economists have investigated the 
consequences of asymmetric information in the labor market. Although Spence studied 
the consequences of signaling in a competitive market, a large part of the subsequent 
literature is game theoretic in nature.1 In the strategic literature the typical model has two 
firms competing for one worker whose ability is unknown. The reason that a worker may 
signal his ability is due to the fact that firms are willing to offer higher wages to more 
able workers (who have signaled their ability). In this type of models there is no role for 
unemployment.  
 
It is quite plausible that signaling is more observed in periods of unemployment than in 
times of full employment. The main reason workers (students) may signal their (high) 
ability is that they want to increase their chances of getting a (well-paid) job. In order to 
study the impact of unemployment on the signaling activity of workers I look at a 
situation in which N workers compete for one job in one firm.2 The ability of each worker 
is modeled as an independent draw from a common pool of abilities. Each individual 
worker knows his own ability, but does not know the abilities of the other workers. The 
firm only knows the characteristics of the common pool from which abilities are drawn. 
In the model, the firm sets wages before the workers signal and firms are committed to 
pay the wages they announced.3 Once the firm has observed the signals, it will choose 
one of the workers. 
 
The model is intended to describe certain segments of the labor market, especially the 
market for hipo’s, i.e., high potential (hipo) students who just graduated and apply for 
“big boys in the city jobs”, including jobs in investment banking, consultancy and law 
                                                                 
1 See, e.g., Cho and Kreps (1987) for the first complete game theoretic analysis of the Spence model, and 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Rasmusen (1989) for textbook presentations. 
2 For a survey of the way monopsony models have been used in studies of the labor market, see Boal and 
Ransom (1997). 
3 Hence, our model falls in the category of screening models (see Weiss, 1995). The reason for the 
assumption is that in a signaling model in which workers signal before the firm sets its wages, the signaling 
costs of the worker are sunk and the firm does not have an incentive to set a wage above the reservation 
wage of the worker. 
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firms. Firms in these market segments have a reputation for offering high wages and 
students in universities and MBA programs know this.4 The commitment to paying high 
wages that we assume is made credible through this reputation mechanism. Students 
compete to get jobs for these highly paid jobs by trying to get high grades, doing many 
extra curricular activities, and so on. Accordingly, the signals that are modeled here are 
not just education, but activities students employ during or besides their studies (cv-
building). As long as these signals are positively correlated with ability, firms are willing 
to offer higher wages, because it increases the chance of attracting high ability workers.5 
 
The main result of the model says that there for a wide range of parameter values there is 
a positive relation between the size of unemployment, measured by N, and the relative 
wage rate, i.e., the monopsonist firm sets higher relative wages, the larger the number of 
workers looking for a job.6 The intuition for the result can be explained in two steps. 
First, if the firm wants high ability workers to signal their ability it should set higher 
wages, the higher unemployment. As the firm is a monopsonist in the labor market, it will 
set the lowest wage possible such that high ability workers will signal their ability. High 
ability workers will only signal their ability if the expected returns of doing so are larger 
than the signaling cost. As the chance of getting a job in case of signaling decreases with 
the size of unemployment, the expected returns of signaling are decreasing in N. 
Therefore, the higher the unemployment rate, the higher the wage the firm has to set in 
order to induce the high ability workers to signal. Second, the incentives for firms to 
make workers signal their ability are stronger, the larger the level of unemployment. If no 
worker signals, the firm has to choose one of the workers at random. However, if the 
number of applicants becomes larger relative to the number of vacancies, the chances of 
getting really good people becomes larger. Thus, it may be the case that the firm does not 
                                                                 
4 It can be argued that these firms commit themselves to setting high wages by organizing information 
gatherings for the students in which they inform them about their career perspectives. 
5 Alternatively, it makes the selection costs of the firms lower, because part of the selection is done in the 
form of self-selection on the part of the students. 
6 For simplicity, we keep the reservation wage constant in our model. The wage rate that appears in the 
model should be interpreted as a level of wages relative to the reservation wage. To the extent that the 
reservation wage depends on N, our result basically says that the gap between the “haves” and the “have 
nots” increases with the level of unemployment. In this way, we explain the empirical fact alluded to 
above. 
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induce the workers to signal their ability for low levels of unemployment, but that it does 
induce them to signal at larger unemployment levels. This explains that at certain levels 
of unemployment the wage rate may jump upwards.  
 
If we interpret the main result as saying that the wage rate of higher income groups goes 
up relative to some average wage, then we can interpret our model as a simple 
explanation of the well-known empirical fact that the difference between low and high 
income groups becomes larger if unemployment increases. Blinder and Esaki (1978: 
607), for example, find that “each one percent point rise in the unemployment rate takes 
about 0.26%-0.30% of the national income away from the lowest 40% of the income 
distribution and gives it to the richest 20%.” Especially, high income groups apparently 
benefit from high levels of unemployment. Similar results are also found in other studies, 
see e.g., Gramlich  (1974). Despite the fact that the empirical finding is quite robust, no 
good theoretical explanation has been offered. This paper attempts to fill this gap by 
offering an explanation based on asymmetric information and screening. 
 
Information asymmetries have been used in many different ways in studies of the labor 
market; see Weiss (1995) for a survey. Traditionally, the focus was on asymmetric 
information between a worker and a firm about the worker’s ability level. More recently, 
a number of papers have shifted attention to an employer’s private information (vis-à-vis 
the market) about an employee’s ability (see, e.g., Waldman, 1984 and Gibbons and 
Katz, 1991). In contrast, I stay within the framework set out by Spence (1973). Dynamic 
issues concerning signaling and education have been studied in Nöldeke and van Damme 
(1990). 
 
In the efficiency wage literature (see Weiss, 1990 for a survey) a firm chooses to set 
relatively high wages as this yields higher labor productivity. Two mechanisms are 
distinguished, a selection effect and an incentive effect. Our paper can be considered as 
giving an alternative explanation for the selection mechanism based on asymmetric 
information. At low wages, firms have to select a worker at random, whereas at higher 
wages, workers selects themselves out through signaling and the firm can select from a 
smaller pool of high quality workers. 
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Another related paper is that of Lazear and Rosen (1981). They show that it may be 
optimal for a firm to set wages based on rank, and to pay high salaries to executives, as 
this provides incentives for all other individuals in the firm to work hard in order to “win” 
one of the executive positions in the future. Our model shows that the idea of competitive 
lotteries can also be applied in the labor market, a well-paid job being the “prize” and 
fellow students being the competitors. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In section 3 I analyze 
the model and characterize the equilibrium properties and depend on the parameters. 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. The Model 
 
The model has N workers and one firm with one job vacancy.7,8 In stage 0, Nature 
decides about the type of each worker. Workers can be of different abilities; the ability of 
agent I is denoted by iq . Abilities are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. The 
ability level is private information to the worker, i.e., neither the firm nor the other 
workers know the ability of a worker. In stage 1 the firm offers wage contracts. It sets 
two wages, w(1) and w(0), where w(1) denotes the wage for a worker who signals and 
w(0) denotes the wage for a worker who does not signal. As it is optimal for the firm to 
set w(0)=0, we will concentrate on w(1) and when there is no room for confusion, we 
drop the dependence of the wage rate on the signal. In stage 2 knowing the wages that are 
offered, workers decide whether or not to signal. For simplicity, I assume that the signal s 
can take on two values, 0 (no signal) or 1 (signal). Finally, in the last stage of the game 
the firm selects one worker possibly based on the signal it observes. If none of the 
workers signals or if they all signal, the firm randomly selects a worker. If some workers 
signal and the others do no, it may choose randomly among the workers that signaled or 
among those that did not.  
                                                                 
7 In other words, the marginal productivity of labor of a second worker is very low. 
8 In a discrete version of the model (see, Janssen, Makansi and Morrison, 1997) we analyze a duopsony 
extension with two firms hiring workers. The analysis is quite messy, but for some parameter values the 
equilibrium exhibits similar properties as the equilibrium of the present model. 
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The pay-off to the firm depends on the worker it hires and the wages it offers. The pay-
off to the worker if he is hired depends on the wages that are offered and the signaling 
cost. Denote the ability (or labor productivity) of individual i by qi and the signaling cost 
of individual i by c(qi). I assume that the signaling cost of an individual with ability level 
q  to be given by qq
kc =)( , i.e., it is more costly to signal for a low ability worker than 
for a high ability one. In order to have non-trivial solutions, I assume k<½. The pay-off to 
the firm when hiring worker i with signal s is then given by pf = qi  - w(s) and the pay-off 
to the worker who is hired by pi= w(s) - c(qi). The workers that signaled and are not hired 
get a negative pay-off equal to their signaling cost.9 Both the firm and the workers are 
assumed to be risk neutral and maximize their pay-offs given the strategies of the others.   
  
 
3. Equilibrium Properties 
 
In this section I will analyze the equilibrium properties of the model. From the set-up 
described in the previous section, it is clear that the firm can set w(1) and w(0) in such a 
way that workers with ability levels larger than some critical level q* will signal and 
workers with an ability level lower than q* do not signal. What the firm is in fact doing is 
dichotomizing the continuous type space. A worker with ability q* or above will signal if 
the wage multiplied by the probability of getting the job is at least equal to his cost of 
signaling. The probability of getting the job depends, in turn, on the number of people 
who have an ability level larger than q*. It can be shown that the probability of getting the 
job is given by10 
                                                                 
9 Hence, we assume that the worker’s reservation wage is zero. 
10 Using: the fact that ÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ-
=÷÷ø
ö
ççè
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k
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Hence, in the N worker case, workers with ability level larger than or equal to q* will 
signal if the wage is at least: 
)*1(
*)(*)1(
)1(
N
cN
w
q
qq
-
-=        (2) 
Workers with ability levels smaller than q* will not signal at this wage rate. By using (2) 
the maximization problem of the firm can be written as if the firm chooses q*: 
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Substituting the signaling cost function, and the separating wage given in (2) in (3) I get:  
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which reduces to 
*
*
* )1(*
2
1
)1(
2
1
q
qqqp --+-= kN
N
f .     (5) 
 
Maximizing this expression with respect to ability yields an optimal q*. This is the 
demarcation ability level chosen by the firm in the separating equilibrium. The optimal q* 
is implicitly defined by 
0
*
*
2 22
11 =++- -
q
q kNN N .       (6) 
From the q* that solves equation (6) the wage w(q*) that the firm offers follows by virtue 
of (2). In order to emphasize the fact that the optimal wage rate and the demarcation 
value of q depend on the exogenous parameters N and k, we also write )(kwN and 
)(kNq , respectively. The rest of the section is devoted to investigate how )(kwN and 
)(kNq depend on N and k. 
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First, note that the second-order derivative of the profit function with respect to q is 
strictly negative and that the first-order derivative at q =0 is strictly positive. This implies 
that for each value of N and k there is a unique optimal value of q* in [0,1], possibly 1 
itself. In order to have an interior solution the first-order derivative at q =1 must be 
strictly negative. This is the case if  
 0)(
2
1
2
1 <+- Nk . 
When this condition is violated, it is optimal for the firm to set wages in such a way that 
no agent signals his ability and the firm randomly selects one of the agents. I will define 
the corresponding wage rate to be equal to 0. Figure 1 indicates the region of N and k 
where the firm chooses to induce agents to signal. From the figure it is clear that for a 
given value of k unemployment must be larger than a certain critical value to make it 
worthwhile for the firm to induce workers to signal. Basically, the idea here is that if the 
number of applicants is large relative to the number of vacancies, the chances of getting 
really good people becomes larger and it pays to have them self-select. The firm has to 
offer a strictly positive wage to induce signaling. Hence, when the unemployment level 
irises above a critical value, the optimal wage rate jumps from zero upwards. This is the 
second effect mentioned in the Introduction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figuur 1: For a given level of k the unemployment level has to be high enough to have 
the firm induce agents to signal their ability 
k
½
0
N1
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In case of an interior solution, we can also ask the question how the optimal wage rate  
)(kwN depends on the unemployment level, measured by N. it turns out that the 
dependence is unambiguously positive: the larger N, the larger )(kwN . The result is 
formally stated in Proposition 1.  
 
Proposition 1. If 0)(
2
1
2
1 <+- Nk , then )(kwN is positively related to N. 
 
The proof is given in the appendix. The standard way of proving a result like the one of 
Proposition 1 is to use the envelope theorem. Unfortunately, as we cannot explicitly write 
q  as a function of w, it is difficult to assess Nwf ¶¶¶ /
2p . Instead, the proof compares 
the optimal value of )(1 kN +q  with a demarcation value of q  in case the firm would keep 
its wage rate at the level of )(kwN . It is shown that the optimal value of )(1 kN +q  is 
smaller and that therefore the firm has to adjust its wage rate upward. The main economic 
intuition is that as unemployment increases, the chance of getting a job in case of 
signaling decreases and so is the expected returns of signaling. Therefore, the higher the 
unemployment rate, the higher the wage the firm has to set in order to induce the high 
ability workers to signal. 
 
The impact of N on )(kNq is less clear. When the cost of signaling is very low, i.e., k is 
close to 0, it follows from (6) that )(kNq  is approximately equal to 11-N N . This 
expression is increasing in N. If, on the other hand, k is such that for a certain N )(kNq is 
close to 1, then it follows from (6) that )()(1 kk NN qq <+ . There are two opposing forces 
at work. A lower value of )(kNq  increases the chances of having at least one individual 
signal. This is beneficial to the firm as it can select a high ability worker. On the other 
hand, firms have to pay higher wages if it wants to induce more signaling. N When 
)(kNq  is close to 1,  the first effect is important as the probability of any individual 
signaling is small, while second effect is negligible as the probability is small that there is 
another agent with an ability level close to 1. Hence, )()(1 kk NN qq <+  when )(kNq is 
close to 1. The reverse holds true when )(kNq  is approximately equal to 11-N N . 
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Figures 2 and 3 illustrate how for different values of k the optimal value of q* and w(q*) 
varies with N. For small values of k, the firm induces agents to signal for all values of 
N>1. Figure 2 shows for k=0.2 that q* is first decreasing and then increasing in N and that 
it approaches 1 for large N. Hence, as unemployment increases beyond a critical value 
firms become more and more selective. Substituting q* into equation (2) yields the 
relation between the optimal wage w and N also depicted in figure 2. One can see that 
wages are smoothly increasing in N that they increase by around 40% from N=2 to N=10 
and that the increase smoothens out when N increases further.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. q* and w(q*) as a function of N for k=0.2. 
 
When k is larger, the firm does not induce the agents to signal for small values of N. This 
is depicted in Figure 3 for k=0.4. the figure shows that wages jump upwards at k=5 and 
increase smoothly from that moment onwards. The corresponding values of q* are very 
close 1 and show a similar pattern as in figure 2. 
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Figure 2. q* and w(q*) as a function of N for k=0.2. 
 
 
Finally, I briefly discuss the impact of the cost of signaling measured by k on )(kwN and 
)(kNq . From equation (6) it is clear that the impact on )(kNq  is positive as long as there 
is an interior solution, i.e., the higher the cost of signaling the higher the demarcation 
value chosen by the firm. Also, the impact of a higher k on )(kwN  is, as is to be 
expected, positive. If the firm would not adjust )(kNq  the wage the firm has to set 
increases quite sharply in k. The firm partially off-sets this pressure on the wages it has to 
pay to induce agents to signal by increasing the demarcation value )(kNq . In this way, 
there is a smaller chance that someone has an ability larger than the demarcation value, 
and accordingly, a person with a high ability level has to be compensated to a lesser 
extent. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have analyzed the consequences of unemployment on the relative wage 
that is set by firms to sort out workers (students) with different ability levels. It has been 
shown that in a variety of settings this relation is positive, i.e., the higher unemployment, 
the higher the (relative) wage set by the firm(s). This indicates that the gap between the 
rich and the poor, i.e., between those that have a well-paid job and those that have not, 
may become larger in situations where the model applies. I think that this is the case in 
“big boys in the city jobs” in the sphere of investment banking, consultancy and law 
firms.  
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Appendix 1. (Proof of Proposition 1) 
 
We will prove that for any k, )1()( +< NwNw . The proof is in several steps. We first 
look for a fixed N at the first order condition for profit maximization. From (7) it follows 
that the optimal q* has to satisfy:  
 ,0
2 22
11 =++- -
N
N
N
kNN
q
q       (A.1) 
where Nq   is the optimal value of q for a given N. Note that for a fixed value of N, Nq  
is increasing in k. This in turn implies that the smallest value of Nq  is given by 11-N N , 
which is larger than ½. From (A.1) it follows that for any k,  
 
1
2
12
1
2
1
+
-=- +++
+
NN
NN
N
N
N
N q
q
q
q .     (A.2) 
From equation (2), we can also derive a relation between different values of q  in case the 
firm does not adjust w when N increases. I denote by 1
~
+Nq  the value of the demarcation 
value of 1+Nq  when the firm does not adjust the wage rate from its optimal value in case 
of N unemployed agents. for each value of Nq . It follows that 
 )
~
...
~
()...)(1( 11
N
NN
N
NN NN ++ ++=+++ qqqq .   (A.3) 
From equation 2 it easily follows that for a fixed N, w is decreasing in q for all q<1. The 
proof concentrates on the relation between 1+Nq  and 1
~
+Nq  and we show that 
11
~
++ < NN qq . This implies that the optimal value of q is smaller than the value in case 
the firm does not adjust w. This together with the fact that w is decreasing in q implies 
that if N increases, the firm should adjust its wage upwards. 
From (A.3) it follows that 1
~
+< NN qq . On the other hand, from (A.1) it does not 
follow that 1+< NN qq . In case NN qq <+1 , it follows trivially that 11
~
++ < NN qq . 
Hence, in the rest of the proof we concentrate on the case where 1+< NN qq .  
For notational simplicity, we will use in the rest of the proof x and y instead of 
Nq  and 1+Nq , respectively. Using this notation, we rewrite (A.2) as  
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1
+
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N
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y
N
x
x NN . 
For each x let us define 1y  as the solution to 1
11
1
1
+
-=--
N
y
N
x NN . For all x such 
that yx £ we know that 1yy £ . We can rewrite the equation defining 1y  as  
1 1 )1(
1
-
+
+= N N
NN
yx .      (A.4) 
Next, let us rewrite (A.3) as )~...~()...)(1( 1+++=+++ NN yyNxxN . For each x 
let us define 2y  implicitly as the solution to 
2
22)1( yNyxN +=+ . I will argue that 
yy ~2 £ . The proof consists of two steps. The first step argues that if 
2
22)1( yNyxN +=+ , then 
1
22)1()1(
++-+³+ kkk kyykNxN  for all k. Details of this 
first step are given below. The second step argues that if for all k 
1
22)1()1(
++-+³+ kkk kyykNxN , then it follows by simple summation that 
å³å+
+
==
1
1
2
1
)1(
N
j
jN
j
j yNxN . As  y~  is implicitly defined by å=å+
+
==
1
11
~)1(
N
j
jN
j
j yNxN , it 
follows that yy ~2 £ .  
The proof of the first part is by induction on k. It is clear that the statement holds for 
k=1. So, suppose then that the statement holds true up to a certain k, 2 £ k < N, i.e., if 
2
222)1( yNyyN +=+ , then 
1
22)1()1(
++-+³+ kkk kyykNxN . We will then show that 
also if 222 yNyx)1N( +=+ , then 
2
2
1
2
1 )1()()1( +++ ++-³+ kkk ykykNxN . This is the case 
if (using expressions for x and 1+kx ) 
2
2
1
2
1
22
2
22 )1()(
)1(
])1)[(( ++
+
++-³
+
+-++ KK
kk
ykykN
N
kyykNyNy
 
222 )1)(1()1)((]1)[( ykNNkNkykNyN ++++-³+-++Û  
02 222 ³+-Û ykyk  
0)1( 22 ³-Û yk . 
Hence, if 222)1( yNyxN +=+  then 
1
22)1()1(
++-+³+ kkk kyykNxN  for all Nk ££2 .  
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We can rewrite the equation defining 2y  as )1(
2
22
+
+
=
N
yNy
x .  (A.5) 
 
Finally, we prove  that 21 yy < . Using (A.4) and (A.5) and the fact that in both 
equations x is a monotonically increasing function of 1y  and  2y , respectively, it suffices 
to show that for the some arbitrary value of zyy == 21 :  
1
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We first consider 3=N . In this case (A.6) reduces to 223
43 )3(16 zzz +>+ , or 
0
3
4
910 234 <-+- zzz . Straightforward calculations show that the maximum value of 
the L.H.S. of this inequality is negative (approx. –0.09). Hence, (A.6) holds for 3=N . I 
next consider 3>N . To this end, define a function   
N
N
zNzNzNzf
N
NNNN
2
111 )1()1()();(
-
--- +-+-+=  . 
I will show that for every fixed y this function is decreasing in N. 
)log()())(1(log)( 1211 zNzNzNNzzzN
N
f NNNN ++++-++=
¶
¶ ----  
)1log()1()1)(1(log)1( 121 ++-+--+- --- NNNNzzN NNNN  
++-+-= -- ])1())[(1( 22 NN NzNN  
)1log()1()log()( 11 ++-+++ -- NNzNzN NN   (A.7) 
 ])1()[(log 111 zNzNzz NNN --- +-++ . 
It is clear that the first two terms of (A.7) are negative for all 1<z . The third and last 
term is also negative if 0)1()( 11 ³+-+ -- zNzN NN  for all 10 ££ z . To see that this is 
the case note the expression equals 0 at z=1 and that the first order derivative with respect 
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to y equals  
)11()1()1())(1( 212 ---+£+-+- --- NNNNzNN NNN , 
which is negative. Hence, (A.6) holds for all 3³N . Finally, for 2=N , (A.6) reduces  
to yzNzN )()1( 2
12 +>++  , or, 022 2
12 >+- zz . It is easy to see that this holds if 
2
1>z , which is true given the discussion just below (A.1).  
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